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Defendant, hereinafter referred to as Prescott, disagn'PS with plaintiff's state1nent that "the injury of real
eont'Pquence" \Vas a trau1natic amputation of his left leg
etc. The ~ledical AdYisory Board did not attempt to
~t:gTt•gntP the effects of, or allocate relative importance
to, hi:3 many injuries to the chest, shoulder, abdomen and
limh:3, but rather considered their cumulative effect.
Prescott agrees that the Board found that he sustained
a 90% loss of body function as a result of multiple injuries, but disagrees with the further "statement of
faet" by plaintiff. which is a sweeping conclusion that
~ueh language was used solely in the sens(·, "as that term
i~ employed in the next to the concluding paragraphs of
~t'l'. 35-1-66 r.C.~\. 1953, the section relating to pern1aSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2

nent partial disability. Now here in tlH' n'<'onl is then'
any such statement or inference.
Prescott disagrees with the staternent that "because
of his age, mentality and lirnited ambulation he cannot
compete for employment". He cannot compete for employment because of a 90o/o loss of body function as a
result of multiple injuries.
Prescott further believes the facts to be incompletely
stated and in view of the nature of this appeal restates
the facts on which the Commission based its decision.
Respondent John W. Prescott, born April 15, 1897,
(R-58) had been employed by United Park City Mines
Company and its predecessors in interest for thirty-three
years, (R-59). During the last thirty-one years of this
time he had been a motorman on the underground railway hauling ore and waste to the surface, (R-60). On
July 31, 1961, while uncoupling cars, the train started and
he was run over by the locomotive, suffering crippling
injuries hereinafter detailed.
The nature of and concise sununary of Prescott's
injuries are set forth in the letter of Harold B. Lamb,
M.D., his attending physician, from which we quote in
part, (R-8, 9).
"A brief list of his injuries include:
1. Comminuted fracture of the right scapula involving the glenoid fossa.
2. Dislocation of the right sterno-clavicular joint.
3. Cornrninuted fractures of 3 thru 7 ribs on right
side.
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3.
-l. La<·Pration of right lung with extensive henwthorax and pneumothorax.

;). 'framnatic pneu1nonitis right lung, severe.
(i.

~pn•n• contmninated avulsion injury of left
groin with destruction of most of the lymphatic, subcutaneous tissue, and adductor muscles
of the proximal thigh with preservation but
denudation of the femoral vessels. In addition
the scrotum and perineum was lacerated so
that there was exposure of testicular tissue
and denudation of the membraneous urethra
with diaruption of periosteal tissues of the
pubis and ischium. There were full thickness
abrasions involving the medial hemicircumferencP of the thigh fr01n the groin to the knee.

1.

Trau1natic contaminated amputation of leg
through knee joint.

The report of Boyd G. Holbrook, 1LD., consulting
Orthopedic surgeon, (R-5,6) should be fully considered
in eonh•xt with its concluding paragraph, which we quote:
"Some permanent disability of the right
shoulder girdle is expected as a result of these
injuries, but is anticipated that they will heal in
a satisfactory manner with a satisfactory end
result."
The finding of the ~Iedical Advisory Board con-

sisting of Korn1an B. Beck, M.D., Chainnan, Burke M.
~nm,·, ~I.D. and Boyd G. Holbrook :M.D., should be con~idered in its pertinent entrirety, which we set forth as
follows, (R-15) :
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"The Board recomrnends 90% loss of body
function as a result of multiple injuries. The groin
scar should be revised."
The report of the attending physician, (R-20) Harold
B. Lamb, in response to the suggestion of the Medical Advisory Board relative to scar revision, is also
significant as to the nature of the inguinal injuries,
"'There is no doubt but what some improvement of the scarred area over the inguinal region
could be achieved. Since there was originally a
large area of soft tissue loss which healed by
granulation and scarring, there is some tension of
the tissues in this area and an adequate revision
of the scar would probably require some rotation
of tissues into the defect. In addition, it should
be noted that the femoral vessels are covered in
this area only by the scar tissue just previously
described. There is no intervening muscle or
fascial structure to protect these vessels. Re section of this area might involve some risk to the
competency of these vessels. Since this procedure
would be relatively major, it would require some
type of block or general anaesthesia. J\ir. Prescott
has marginal cardio-vascular compensation, as
well as poor puln1onary exchange. It is my opinion at this time that he does not have sufficient
trouble relative to the scar to warrant the risk
required in its revision. If he should have increasing difficulties such that it would not be
practical for him to continue to wear his prosthesis, such recommendation would be changed."
The report of consulting physician, (R-101) Roy
E. ~r cDonald, M.D., relative to the lung and heart conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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dition of Prt>~('ott while he was hospitalized is indicative
of the gTo~~nP~~ of tlw nnlltiplt> injuriP~ and shock suft't·rl'd hy J>n·~·wott and their general debilitating effect
upon him.
( )n February ~>, 1963 Prescott was referred to Roy
K Darkt•, :\I.D. for p~:n·hiatric evaluation prior to the
rPI'PrPIH'P of hi~ case to the Division of Vocational Rehabiljtation of the State Board of Education, (R-23).

The report of Paul T. Furlong of the Division of
rocational Rehabilitation (R-29, 30) and his testimony
at the hearing (R-72, 83) result in an opinion that
PrP~eott is not a feasible candidate for vocational rehabilitation and that he be considered totally and permanently disabled for employment.
Factually Prescott was fitted for, and at all times
herein, uses an artificial limb. He does have limited
ambulation.

ARGUMENT
POIN·T I
THE ONLY SIGNIFICANT LOSS OF FUNCTION IN
THIS CASE IS THE LOSS ~TTENDANT UPON LEG AMPUTATION, AND THE RULE THAT PERMANENT TOTAL
DISABILITY MAY BE PRESUMED FROM INABILITY TO
RESUME PRE-INJURY TYPE OF WORK DOES NOT APPLY
WHERE THE LOSS SUSTAINED IS ONE OF THOSE IN
THE STATUTORY SCHEDULE OF SPECIFIC AWARDS.
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Prescott disagrees with the factual basis upon which
the plaintiff frames the foregoing argument. We would
concede that if Prescott had suffered only the loss of
"one leg, at or near the hip joint, as to preclure the
use of an artificial limb," his disability would be rated
at 180 weeks pursuant to the provision of 35-1-66 U.C.A.
1953. These facts are not so. His leg was traumatically
amputated at the knee and was surgically revised by
amputation just above the knee and he has been fitted
with an artificial limb which he uses. To ignore the detailed medical evidence in this case and to substitute a
theory based upon deductive reasoning is novel indeed.
The difficulty lies in the fact that there is not a scintilla
of evidence to support plaintiff's theory.
The rating of the Medical Advisory Board (R-15)
is that "'The Board recommends 90% loss of body function as a result of multiple injuries." The groin scar
should be revised.
Plaintiff had an opportunity to elicit testimony in
support of its theory, but did not so do. Dr. Beck, Medical
Advisory Board Chairman, was called as a witness and
was asked to state the physical injuries on which the
rating of 90% was based; he replied (R-55) "Well, it
was on the basis of his amputation and other injuries
involving the ribs, the chest and lungs." When asked
to elaborate Dr. Beck indicated further that it was based
on Prescott's history and the medical records. Plaintiff
thought the rnedical records to be the best evidence of
what those injuries were, (R-56).
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.\g·uin at ( H-Sii) Dr. Beck, in response to question
of tltt• n·fpn•t•, indicatPs that in addition to the aforelllt·nt imwd injuries I >r<'~eott suffered a rather severe
.~roin injury detailed in the rnedical records.
Sig-nificant then is thl· cmuplete lack of inquiry to
tht- ( 'hairman of the :Medical Advisory Board as to whetht>r or not the tht>ory offered this Court has any merit.
ThP an~\n'r is simple, tlH·n· is no evidence in the record
to ~u~tain it.
X o good ean be accmnplished in rehashing the signifirance of the various injuries. This is the area of the
t'\IH'rt. The PXpPrt opinion, uncontradicted, fully supported and docurnented by the rnedical records is, "a 90%
loss of body function as a result of multiple injuries.
The groin score should be revised."

POINT II
90% LOSS OF FUNCTION UNDER SECTION 35-1-66
U.C.A. 1953, IS NOT 'TANTAMOUNT TO TOTAL DISABILITY.

Again Prescott disagrees with plaintiff's basic premi::;P. Prescott was not rated by the Medical Board upon
the basis of 90% loss of body function equivalent to the
lo~~ of an arm at the shoulder or the loss of a leg at or
near the hip joint. The finding this court must consider
must be "a 90% loss of body function as a result of
multiple injuries."
Prescott contends that he is not limited to the proYisions of 35-1-66 l~.C.A. because this is the only place
the words '"bodily function" appear. X or does Prescott
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concede that the :Medical Advisory Board has the final
determination of whether or not the defendant is permanently and totally disabled. This is the province of the
Industrial Commission.
The position of Prescott in this case is best illustrated and supported by Silver J(ing Coalition Mining
Co. vs. Industrial Commission, 69 P. 2d 608, (92
U. 511) written by Justice \Volfe and concurred in by
all members of the Court. In a very similar accident,
involving crushing injuries to the chest, the applicant
was found by the Medical Committee to have suffered
total body disability of 50%. However, after hearings
and examination by the Board, the Commission awarded
an additional 40 weeks which would interpolate to a loss
of 70% of 200 weeks. "There was no direct evidence of
a 70% loss by anyone," says Justice Wolfe.
As was typical of Justice Wolfe, the opinion reviews
the various authorities cited by both plaintiff and defendant herein. What is most important in the case at
hand is Justice Wolfe's analysis in the opinion when the
loss of bodily function approaches a total loss. vV e quote
his discussion of the problem in its entirety c01nmencing
at page 613:
"(11, 12) It should be noted that there is a
seeming difficulty in the application of the last
part of section 42-1-62, (now 35-1-66) above quoted, when the loss of bodily function approaches
a total loss. Section 42-1-63 (now 35-1-67) provides that certain loss of bodilv n1e1nbers or parts
or the total loss of use of th~m shall in law be
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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<'OII~idt-rt>d a~ total penuanent di~ahilit~·. For such
lo~~ thP sufi'Pn'r obtains compensation for 260
wPt-k~ at 60 }>PI' eent. of hi~ \ntges, thereafter

until dt>ath at -l3 p<'r cent. of his wages with a
maximum of $16 and a Ininin1u1n of $7 a week
providP<l. Tlw next zone takes into consideration
<·a~<·~ whieh are not in law total permanent, but
which tlw emmnission finds so as a matter of fact.
The question 1nay be well asked, and it is collaterally material in this case, what articulation the
Compt>nsation Art makes betwe<•n those cases
where thP loss of bodily function is not total but
~u('h a great percentage of the full functions as
to pnwtically make the applicant industrially or
P<·mwmically totally and permanently disabled.
Under the part of Section 42-1-63, above referred to, the compensation is still based, as in
thl' case of a loss of an arm or leg, on loss of
bodily function regardless of earning power. As
stated in the dissenting opinion of the Caillet
Ca8e, a 1nan might suffer great loss of bodily
function under this section and be paid for that
loss, although it were shown that he was earning
ten times as 1nuch as before as a radio announcer,
and YicP versa, a brilliant pianist who lost a finger
would get only compensation for the loss of his
finger, although his livelihood was gone. The
compensation for permanent partial disability is
measured either by the sehedule or in proportion
thereto and as deen1ed equitable on the loss of
bodily function alone, and the n1aximum is 200
weeks. But if the applicant clai1ns total and permanent disability the issue is as to whether he is
totally and permanently disabled industrially and
economically. There is a hvilight zone where one
blends into the other. That i~. the loss of bodilY
function may be so great as to leave one totall}~
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and permanently disabled industrially. Thus a
person with 90 per cent loss of bodily function
might be able to prove himself totally a11d JH>rnwuently disabled. If soJ he u:ould take himself out
of the class of applicants limited to recover u ucler
the paragraph of section -±2-1-62, alJove quoted)
and put himself in the class where his compensation should be determined by his total lack of industrial or economical ability. But until that point
is reached, the permanent partial disability is
seemingly compensated for on loss of bodily function alone with a maximum of 200 weeks. The fact
that a workman may stop in the zone of permanent partial, not quite going over into the zone of
permanent total, and therefore obtain a maximum
of only 200 weeks, whereas, a trifle more disability would bring him into what the commission
might find as a fact to be an industrial or economic
permanent total giving him 260 weeks plus 45 per
cent. for the remainder of his life, leads us to
wonder whether this 200 weeks' maximum is supposed to be the equivalent to a total loss of bodily
function as the commission seemed to conceive
it in this case. The applicant had a loss of bodily
function of 70 per cent. The commission, therefore, gave him 140 weeks' compensation on tlw
theory evidently that if he had 100 per cent. loss
of bodily function he ·would have been totally
permanently disabled industrially and economically and therefore be entitled to compensation for
the rest of his life."
It is submitted that J ustire \Y olfe's analysis is a
complete ans·wer to plaintiff's proposition discussed under Point II.
Consider further Justice \Volfe's dissent in Caillet
vs Tndnstrial Commission) 58 P. 2d 760 at page 763 (90
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r.

<") WhPI'Pin

}w

eonsiden; wJwt COnstitutPS total dis-

ability:
"\\'hen we get to section .f-2-1-63 dealing with
total permanent disability, we are once 1nore back
in the field of actual loss of ability without condusivP presu1nptions of law as in section .f-2-1-62,
exeept in the case of the loss or complete loss of
both hands, or both anns, or both feet, or both
legs, or both eyes, or any two thereof. In all other
<·ases there Inust be a proof of per1nanent total
disasbility. What is 'total disability J' It does not
mean total loss of bodily function. If so, a man
would have to be hopelessly paralyzed. It does
not n1ean such disability which would prevent
any person from doing any work. If that were so,
it would Inean loss of mind, for some persons
have energy and will to re-train themselves to earn
so long as their minds are good. It means disablement of the particular applicant to earn wages
in the type of work (not just the particular work
he did do) he was trained for or any other type
work wfflch a person of his mentality and attainments could do. It cannot depend on whether or
not the economic situation prevents him from
getting a job. The test is his capacity, not whether
the economic situation permits that capacity to be
applied in industry."

'r

e submit that Prescott meets the stricter test laid
down by Justice Wolfe in his dissent. We cannot help
but mention also in passing that Justice Wolfe, in his
dissent, concluded that,
uif the Commission in this case had come to
the conclusion that the applicant was totally disabled under the evidence, the award would have
had to be upheld, because the Connnission was the
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one to judge of applicant's ability to earn in am·
field of human activity, and if it had li<'id that thi·~
particular man with his particular Inakeup and
impairment was totally unable to earn substantially his living, we would have upheld it because
still within the zone of reasonable conclusions.
But it is equally qualified to conclude under its
knowledge and experience that this man is not
totally disabled and, in my opinion, that decision
should be upheld."
Prescott also satisfies the requirements of this court
enunciated by Justice Wolfe in his n1ain opinion in
Babick vs Industrial Commission, 65 P. 2d 1133. (91 U.
581)
Admittedly Prescott, with 90% loss of body function
as a result of multiple injuries, is in the zone between
35-1-67 and 35-1-66. There is no showing that Prescott
has "a fair field of economic activity open to the applicant
of the sort which can return him to a fair living. The
Commission did not act arbitrarily. \Ve cannot disturb
the findings," to quote the Courts conclusion in the
Babick case.
The best Prescott might expect if he lived in the
Salt Lake area, which he does not, would be some type
of non-competitive employment such as Deseret Indutries
where people are given work on a charitable basis and
did not have to compete with others to get the job.
(R-81, 82).
POINT III
THE COMMISSION ERRONEOUSLY APPLIED, AS THE
TEST OF TOTAL DlSABILITY, THE DOCTRINE OF THE
CAILLET CASE, AND THAT DOCTRINE HAS BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY MODIFIED.
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.\gTPP WP respectfully disagree with plaintiff's counTt i~ t ruP that tlw Caillet case is Inentioned in the
finding~, but as we view the evidence and the record
Pl'P~eott sati~t'iP~ all of the requirements heretofore laid
down hY this court in all cases mentioned by plaintiff.

:-;t•l.

The sole issue to be determined herein is whether or
not there is con1petent evidence to support the findings
ot' tlw Commission. There is no conflict in the evidence. The cumulative weight of the medical opinion,
the determination of the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation and the testimony adduced at the hearing lead logically to a finding by the Commission of permanent total
disability. Had the finding been any other we submit that
under the principle enunciated in Thomas v. Industrial
Commission, 72 P. 2d 1, (95 U. 32), the Commission
would be reversed.
POINT IV
THIS IS NOT A CASE WHERE A FINDING OF COMMISSION IS UNDER ATTACK, THE ISSUE ON WHICH
REVIEW IS .SOUGHT IS PURELY AN ISSUE OF LAW.

This proposition is novel to say the least. We are
unable to agree, "that the Commission found and everyone agrees that the disability from injury is essentially
the same as the loss of a leg at the hip." The Commission
found, and we agree, that the applicant is permanently
and totally disabled.
The function of this court is to determine from all
of the evidence if the Commission's finding can be supSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ported. We submit that there is no evidence the other
way. To a 90o/o loss of body function from Inultiple injuries add Prescott's mentality, training, education, age
or in essence his capacity, the conclusion of the Commission is inescapable - permanent and total disability,
fully supported by the evidence.
Respectfully sumitted
BRAYTON, LOWE & HURLEY
By ANDREW R. HURLEY
1001 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111

Attorney for defendant
John W. Prescott
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